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Theoretically, encouraging apologies early in the criminal process may
be a laudable goal given the potential benefits of apologies to victims,
offenders, and communities. But empirically, the growing literature on
apologies in psychology and law raises important questions about whether
apologies-when made prior to sentencing-would lead to more favorable
results for the offender. Given the overwhelming portion of cases that are
resolved through guilty pleas, we argue that most defendants are unlikely to
participate in pre-sentencing remorse or apology rituals without regard to the
effect of the apology on plea bargaining outcomes. Mindful of recent
scholarship on apologies in both law and psychology, we consider the role of
apologies in plea bargaining and theorize about the ways in which apologies
might affect plea negotiations. We conclude that, contrary to the assertion
that apologies would lead to more favorable plea bargained outcomes for
defendants, the nature of plea negotiation renders this result unlikely.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CASE FOR APOLOGIES IN PLEA BARGAINING
There is a growing psychological literature that has examined the
effects of apologies on wrongdoers and their victims. As a general
matter, apologies and other expressions of remorse have been found to
produce a range of effects that tend to be positive for both apologizers
and recipients of apologies. In particular, apologies and expressions of
remorse influence attributions of responsibility or blame for the
incident-such that wrongdoers who apologize are thought to have
acted less intentionally and are blamed less for their misdeeds.' When a
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1. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, 43
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 746, 749 (1982) [hereinafter Darby & Schlenker,
Children's Reactions to Apologies]; Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's
Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT.
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 358-60 (1989) [hereinafter Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to
Transgressions]; Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children's Reactions to Mitigating
Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 11 (1994);
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wrongdoer apologizes for his or her conduct, "the offense and the
intention that produced it are less likely to be perceived as
corresponding to some underlying trait of the offender."2 Accordingly,
apologies and expressions of remorse influence beliefs about the general
character of the wrongdoer and the entrenchment of the wrongful
behavior-wrongdoers who apologize are viewed as being of better
character3 and as being less likely to engage in similar behavior in the
future.4 In addition, apologies tend to reduce negative emotions, such
as anger, and to increase levels of more positive emotions, such as
sympathy for the wrongdoer.' Given these changes in attributions and
emotion, individuals who receive apologies when they are wronged
expect to have better future relationships with the wrongdoer,' are more
likely to forgive, are less likely to respond aggressively,' and prefer
Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize?
Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 134-
36 (1997); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281,
291 (1991).
2. Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal
Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 494, 495 (2001); see Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions:
The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222-24 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965) (describing correspondent
inference theory).
3. See, e.g., Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 1, at 749;
Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions, supra note 1, at 360; Gregg J.
Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About
Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 291-92 (2000); Marti
Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as "Narrative Critics": Factors Influencing Rejoinders and
Evaluative Responses to Offenders' Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691,
698 (1994); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating
Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219-20
(1989); Ohbuchi & Sato, supra note 1, at 11; Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman,
Effects of Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressors, 6 ACAD.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 49 (1984); Weiner et al., supra note 1, at 291.
4. See, e.g., Gold & Weiner, supra note 3, at 291-92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 3, at 219-
20; Orleans & Gurtman, supra note 3; Gary S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of Post-
Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level of
Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293, 297 (1978); Weiner et al., supra note
1, at 285.
5. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims' Responses to Apologies: The
Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457, 462 (1994);
Gold & Weiner, supra note 3, at 291-92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 3, at 219-20; Takaku,
supra note 2, at 495; Weiner et al., supra note 1, at 286.
6. Holley S. Hodgins & Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and
Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 312 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 1, at 742,
749; Gold & Weiner, supra note 3, at 291-92; Ohbuchi & Sato, supra note 1, at 12; Weiner et
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more lenient punishment for the wrongdoer.' All this suggests that
apologies have significant utility in various social contexts in which a
harm has occurred.
What we know about apologies generally tells us that apologies may
have a particularly important role to play in the area of criminal law.
Victims who receive apologies or believe that their offenders are
remorseful are more likely to find emotional restoration, to feel a re-
established sense of security, to view the moral relation between the
parties as back in balance, and to forgive their offenders.'0 Indeed, a
central tenet of the victims' rights movement has been to secure or
enable encounters between victims and offenders that might lead to
apologies or explanations for the harmful conduct." Apologies offer the
opportunity for reconciliation and healing, which is viewed by many
victims as being as important as financial compensation.'2
Similarly, apologies can be meaningful for criminal defendants. The
opportunity to apologize to their victims and have some opportunity to
be heard may be restorative. The restorative justice movement is
premised in significant part on the notion that offenders benefit from
the opportunity to make amends with both victims and communities. 3
Restorativists argue that offenders themselves benefit from a system
that encourages apologies.' In particular, offenders who apologize may
al., supra note 1, at 291.
8. See, e.g., Ohbuchi et al., supra note 3, at 219-20.
9. See, e.g., Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 1, at 749;
Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions, supra note 1, at 360; Gold &
Weiner, supra note 3, at 291-92; Weiner et al., supra note 1, at 286.
10. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992) ("[BIy apologizing, we deny the
diminishment of the victim, and our relative elevation, expressed by our wrongful action.");
Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 22-23; MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., VICTIM MEETS
OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 95-96 (1994); Elaine
Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151,
156 (1973) (describing motivations to restore equity).
11. Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and Criminal Justice: What's Next?, 19 FED. SENT'G
REP. 83, 84-85 (2006) (noting that advocates of expanding victims' rights in criminal
prosecutions are particularly in favor of participatory rights).
12. Strang & Sherman, supra note 10, at 22.
13. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 293-94.
14. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 10, at 36-37. But cf. JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 12 (2002) (recognizing that the
restorative process might not necessarily aid defendants inasmuch as it might produce a
harshly punitive result that does not reflect important restorative values "such as apology,
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be able to relieve their guilt and assuage other negative emotions, begin
to repair their relationships with their victims and society, improve their
reputations, and begin a process of reintegrating into society." The
empirical evidence also shows that these offenders are less likely to
recidivate and more likely to be forgiven by their victims. 6  To the
extent that apologies or recognitions of wrongdoing reaffirm societal
legal norms, they can play an important role in the legitimization of
law. 7 Laws that are perceived as legitimate are more likely to be
obeyed. This has obvious community benefits in the area of criminal
justice.
Despite the promising role that apologies could play in the criminal
context, until recently, virtually no criminal law scholars have seriously
considered the role of remorse outside of the sentencing and
dispositional phases of criminal adjudications. As Stephanos Bibas and
Richard Bierschbach contend in their recent essay, Integrating Remorse
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, criminal procedure neglects the
power of remorse and apology by relegating it only to sentencing. 8
They criticize the limited use of apology throughout the criminal justice
process and insist that the lack of focus on remorse and apology
amounts to lost opportunities for victims, defendants, and their
communities. As they put it, apology:
is a powerful ritual for offenders, victims, and
communities, one that criminal procedure could facilitate
by encouraging offenders to interact face to face with
repairing of harm, forgiveness, and reconciliation"). See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244, 252-53 (2002).
15. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1015-23 (1999) (articulating benefits of apologizing in the civil context); Erin Ann O'Hara &
Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1141-42 (2002); see also
Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 253-54 (2005).
16. See William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the
Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 137, 140, 162 (finding a reduction in reoffending); Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A
Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 167, 190-91 tbl.7 & fig.7 (reviewing four studies of offenders' apologies and
one study of victims' forgiveness to find that restorative justice procedures greatly increase
the likelihood of forgiveness).
17. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 6-7 (1995); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,457 (1997).
18. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 89 (2004).
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their victims. The focus would broaden beyond the
individual offender's badness to constructive measures to
heal offenders, victims, and communities. Remorse and
apology would teach offenders lessons, vindicate victims,
and encourage communities to welcome wrongdoers
back into the fold. 19
Bibas and Bierschbach go beyond merely contemplating the benefits
of incorporating remorse and apology into other areas of the criminal
process. They also suggest a number of ways in which this can be put
into practice.2" Most notably, they argue that apologies and expressions
of contrition could play a much larger role in prosecutorial decisions to
dismiss charges or to divert cases for alternate resolutions,2 and
presumably in prosecutors' decisions to make other plea offers.
Theoretically, encouraging apologies in earlier stages of the criminal law
process may be a laudable goal given what we know about apologies and
their potential benefits to victims, offenders, and communities. But
empirically, the growing literature on apologies in psychology and law
raises important questions about whether apologies-when made prior
to a determination of guilt-would lead to more favorable results for the
offender.
In this paper, we begin to explore the assumptions regarding the
practicability of incorporating remorse and apology into criminal
procedure at stages prior to sentencing. We are intrigued by the
argument that apologies could play a significant role in prosecutorial
charging and plea bargaining decisions. While there are many stages in
the processing of criminal cases, charging and plea bargaining22 are
arguably the most important. Plea bargaining has emerged as the most
ubiquitous 23  and outcome-determinative 24  phase of the criminal
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id. at 127-45 (discussing in detail six areas in which remorse and apology could be
better integrated in the criminal process).
21. Id. at 128-29 (explaining that "[riemorse and apology could play a much larger role
in" decisions to forego arrest, defer prosecutions, divert cases, or alter charges).
22. In using the term "plea bargaining," we often mean to include charging decisions by
prosecutors. While charging and plea bargaining can be different and distinct processes, there
is commonly significant overlap. In many instances plea negotiations between prosecutors
and defense attorneys occur well before charging decisions are made. This is particularly
true, although not uniquely so, in white-collar offenses where the defendants are often made
aware that they are being investigated well before they are formally charged or indicted. In
other instances, plea bargaining may involve dismissing some offenses and recharging others.
23. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 718 (Supp. 2006) (describing plea bargaining as "well-
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prosecution. As George Fisher put it, "plea bargaining has triumphed"
as "it has swept across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished
jury into small pockets of resistance." 25 There are many reasons for this
ascendance. Over the last several decades, prosecutorial power has
been on the rise in state26 and federal courts.27 A prosecutor's charging
decisions, for instance, determine the outcome of a great many cases.
Sentences are dictated by both charging and plea decisions. Because
approximately ninety-five percent of state criminal convictions are
obtained through guilty pleas,' prosecutors exercise enormous power
over a staggering number of cases through plea bargains. Any
significant change in the approach with which defendants and their
attorneys handle criminal cases-such as the incorporation of
apologies-will inevitably take into account the potential impact on plea
bargaining.
Thus, while taking seriously the claim that apologies might have a
beneficial role to play in criminal cases outside of sentencing, we find it
unrealistic to expect that most defendants would participate in remorse
or apology rituals without regard to the effect of the apology on the
outcome of their criminal cases. Because most criminal cases are
resolved with guilty pleas, one has to examine the impact of apologies
on guilty pleas, and on plea bargaining in particular, if there is any hope
entrenched" in the American system); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1998) (describing plea bargaining as "a given" and seeking
reform rather than abolition); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1039-45 (1984) (noting that a large number of criminal justice
scholars and practitioners believe that plea bargaining is an inevitable aspect of the criminal
system).
24. Plea agreements are valuable to prosecutors because they enable them to determine
and predict the outcomes of cases. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39 (2002).
25. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 1 (2003).
26. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1022 (2005) (explaining that state prosecutors "have
significant political power").
27. See Margareth Etienne, Into the Briar Patch?: Power Shifts Between Prosecution and
Defense After United States v. Booker, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 750-51 (2005) (describing
continued rise in prosecutorial power); Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the
Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295,
297-99 (2004); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1336-39 (2005) (describing how the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines greatly enhanced prosecutorial power).
28. Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ojp. usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.
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of encouraging apologies prior to sentencing.
Mindful of recent scholarship on apologies in both legal and
psychological literature, we consider the role of apologies in plea
bargaining and theorize about the ways in which apologies might affect
plea negotiations. In Part II, we first discuss the role of apologies and
remorse in criminal sentencing, noting that studies have consistently
found that apologies are associated with more lenient sentencing. We
then consider the role of apologies in the context of civil settlement
negotiation. We note that the empirical research demonstrates that
apologies affect claimants' perceptions of the harm they suffered,
attributions about the offenders, emotions regarding the offenders,
desire to pursue legal action, and settlement posture. In Part III, the
crux of the paper, we turn to a consideration of apologies in the context
of plea bargaining. We first examine the theory of plea bargaining so as
to set the context for the discussion. An understanding of the goals of
plea bargaining is useful in assessing the motivations and pressures of
the parties and how these might be influenced by the presence or
absence of apologies. In addition, we describe briefly the plea
negotiation process itself in an effort to expose the logistical constraints
the parties face in providing and evaluating apologies. We then
compare and contrast criminal plea negotiations with civil settlement
negotiations and discuss how several important differences might bear
on the impact of apologies. We conclude that, contrary to the assertion
that apologies might lead to more favorable plea bargained outcomes
for defendants, the nature of plea negotiation renders this result
unlikely. Certainly, further empirical research is needed to satisfactorily
answer this question.
II. APOLOGIES IN OTHER LEGAL CONTEXTS
Much attention has been paid in recent years to the role of apology
and remorse in the law. In particular, this attention has focused on the
influence of apology and remorse on criminal sentencing decisions and
on the effects of apology on the settlement of civil cases. Research in
both of these areas shows the potential benefits of apologies and other
expressions of remorse for wrongdoers. However, while both of these
contexts have features in common with plea bargaining, there are also
important differences.
A. Apologies in Criminal Sentencing
In contrast to the studies on settlements in civil cases, virtually no
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work has been done regarding the impact of apologies on the plea
negotiation process in criminal cases. Instead, in the criminal law
context, scholars and practitioners have largely focused on the role of
remorse in the sentencing phase of the criminal case. In particular, they
have debated whether, as a positive matter, apologies or displays of
remorse by defendants (and perhaps their lawyers) result in harsher or
lighter sentences.' 9  In addition, scholars have raised normative
questions about what role, if any, remorse and apology should play in
deriving a just sentence.3 ° Finally, scholars have raised epistemological
questions regarding a fact-finder's ability to know what truly lies in the
hearts and minds of defendants who express remorse."
Some scholars and practitioners reason that defendants who are
remorseful are less likely to repeat their crimes and therefore need little
deterrence.32  Others justify lower sentences on the grounds that
remorseful defendants are less morally blameworthy.33 Perhaps for a
combination of these reasons, studies of the impact of remorse on
sentencing have consistently shown that remorse leads to more lenient
treatment toward defendants at sentencing. Judges tend to use their
discretion to impose lighter sentences on remorseful defendants,34 and
29. See Lisa F. Orenstein, Sentencing Leniency May Be Denied to Criminal Offenders
Who Fail to Express Remorse at Allocution, 56 MD. L. REV. 780, 780 n.8, 785-86 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of
Responsibility": The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1507, 1511, 1515-16 (1997) (urging that
considerations of remorse be eliminated from or minimized in application of "acceptance of
responsibility" guideline); Ellen M. Bryant, Comment, Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Bargaining with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1296-97 (1995) (proposing
to amend "acceptance of responsibility" provision to include automatic reduction for guilty
pleas without consideration of factors like remorse).
31. Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of the Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2162 (2003)
(noting that "some of the problems with using remorse as a sentencing factor are
epistemological" as it is nearly impossible to "tell what is in another's heart or mind"); see,
e.g., O'Hear, supra note 30, at 1511 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines call for
judges to inquire "into the defendant's state of mind" and weigh factors such as "whether the
defendant fully and freely admits to committing the offense, whether the defendant accepts
punishment as an appropriate consequence of the offense, whether the defendant regrets
what was done, and whether the defendant is sincerely committed to avoiding future criminal
activity").
32. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 18, at 93-95.
33. Id.
34. Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 131 (2006)
(noting that "[m]any state courts have found remorse to be an appropriate mitigating factor"
in sentencing); Etienne, supra note 31, at 2123 (explaining how judges use sentencing rules to
reward defendants who show remorse); O'Hear, supra note 30, at 1511 (noting that judges
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legislators tend to pass laws recognizing remorse or acceptance of
responsibility as legitimate grounds for leniency.35 Even capital juries
seem to factor in the remorsefulness of the defendant in deciding
between a life sentence or the death penalty.
6
Given that expressions of remorse lead to more lenient sentences
from judges and juries, one might reasonably assume that such
expressions would lead to more lenient plea offers from prosecutors.
However, the factors at play in plea negotiations are sufficiently distinct
from those in sentencing that the role of remorse in the plea negotiation
context warrants close and independent analysis.
B. Apologies in Civil Settlement
While there has been little examination of the role of apologies in
plea negotiations, recent empirical work has begun to explore how
apologies by civil defendants might influence their prospects for
settlement. This work uses a variety of different methodologies
including studies that ask potential litigants about how they predict they
would react to an injurious situation, studies that ask actual litigants
about their motivations and reactions, and experimental studies that
explore the ways in which people react to systematically varied
situations. This body of work suggests that apologies influence claimant
decision making in a variety of ways, including decisions to seek legal
advice, decisions about whether to file suit, decisions about negotiation
positions, and decisions about settlement.
37
First, there is some evidence that claimants' initial decisions about
whether to pursue lawsuits is influenced by whether the other party
apologizes. For example, one experimental study found that health plan
weigh remorsefulness in sentencing).
35. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of
Responsibility) (2006) (determining the weight to be given to remorse in federal sentencing).
36. Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1614-15 & tbl.2 (1998); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital
Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1560--61 & tbl.1 (1998). Mock jury studies also find that jurors would
impose lesser punishments on remorseful defendants. See, e.g., Chris L. Kleinke et al.,
Evaluation of a Rapist as a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
525, 533-34 (1992); Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, Remorse and a Previously Punished
Offense in Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85
PSYCHOL. REP. 246, 248 & tbl.1 (1999); Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant
Background and Remorse on Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 64, 66
(1976).
37. For a review, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Civil Justice, in CIVIL
JUSTICE: EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Brian Bornstein ed., forthcoming 2007).
20071
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:295
members were less likely to indicate that they would seek legal advice
following medical error when the health care provider disclosed the
error, took responsibility, apologized, and detailed steps that would be
taken to prevent similar errors in the future." This is consistent with
studies finding that people anticipate that they would desire an apology
if injured by another. A number of studies have found that medical
patients report that they would want to receive an apology from their
physician if the physician made a mistake.39 In addition, studies that
have asked litigants about their motives for bringing suit find that many
of these plaintiffs believe that an apology from the other side might have
prevented them from filing suit.'
Recent experimental studies have found that apologies can influence
the ways in which injured parties construe an injury-producing event. In
particular, apologies have been shown to favorably influence a variety of
attributions made about the situation and the other party, including
38. Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical
Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 416 (2004) [hereinafter Mazor et al., Health Plan
Members' Views]. Patients who were told that the physician had provided full disclosure also
reported greater satisfaction, fewer negative emotions, more trust in the health care provider,
and a lower inclination to change providers. Id.; see also Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Disclosure
of Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 704, 708 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding
the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1004 (2003) (finding that patients in focus
groups expressed a desire to receive apologies, assurance that the health care provider
regretted the error, information about what happened, and assurance that such errors would
be prevented in the future); Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views, supra note 38, at 415
(finding that approximately eighty-eight percent of surveyed health plan members endorsed
the notion that following a medical error they "would want the doctor to tell me that he or
she was sincerely sorry"); Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle
Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2566 (1996) (finding that ninety-eight percent of the patients in her
study "desired or expected the physician's active acknowledgement of an error. This ranged
from a simple acknowledgement of the error to various forms of apology.").
40. Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and
Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (finding that nearly forty
percent of claimants who thought that something could have been done to prevent the
litigation indicated that litigation would not have been necessary if the medical provider had
offered an explanation and apologized); see also Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267
JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (finding that claimants in suits involving perinatal injuries were
motivated to file suit when the physician was not forthright about what happened (24%), in
order to find out what had happened to cause the injury (20%), or to deter and punish the
provider, including preventing future injuries (19%)); John Soloski, The Study and the Libel
Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REV. 217, 220 (1985) (reporting interviews with
libel plaintiffs indicating that many of them attempted to first resolve their conflict with the
media source and most of them ask for "retraction, correction, or apology").
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perceptions of the character and the degree of regret experienced by the
other party, expectations about the way in which the other party would
behave in the future, and expectations about the relationship between
the parties going forward." Similarly, apologies have been shown to
influence claimants' emotional reactions-increasing sympathy for the
other party and decreasing anger.42 Claimants, therefore, tend to be
more willing to forgive and to desire less harsh punishment of offenders
when they have received an apology. In addition, apologies have been
found to influence claimants' negotiating positions-lowering their
aspirations and estimates of a fair value for settlement in some
circumstances." Research in other contexts has found that such
settlement levers tend to influence ultimate settlement decisions.
Finally, recent research has found that claimants who receive an apology
from the other party may be more likely to accept a given settlement
offer than those claimants who do not receive an apology. 6
A number of individual institutions and programs report a
connection between apologies and the settlement of civil cases. For
example, at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky, patients are informed of adverse events, and, if the hospital
determines there has been an error, an apology is given and a settlement
41. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485-86 (2003) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal
Settlement]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 333, 370 (2006) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers]; see also
Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions in a
Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393, 397, 404 (2002) (finding that civil defendants who
showed remorse were perceived more positively (study 1) and were rated as having suffered
more (study 2) by mock jurors than were defendants who did not express remorse).
42. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 41, at 475-76.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 485-86.
45. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations
and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 86, 106 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Max H. Bazerman et al.,
Perceptions of Fairness in Interpersonal and Individual Choice Situations, 4 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI., Apr. 1995, at 39, 42; Sally Blount White et al., Alternative
Models of Price Behavior in Dyadic Negotiations: Market Prices, Reservation Prices, and
Negotiator Aspirations, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430
(1994); Sally Blount White & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and
Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 303, 305 (1994).
46. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement.
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 148 (1994) (landlord-tenant dispute);
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 41, at 484-86 (bicycle-pedestrian
collision).
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offer made.47 Since implementing this policy, the hospital reports that
patients are less angry following adverse events and are more likely to
maintain a good relationship with the hospital. The hospital also reports
that it has settled cases more quickly, self-reporting of errors by the
medical professionals has increased, the hospital has received positive
publicity, and litigation costs have declined.' Other institutions have
adopted similar policies and report similarly positive results. 9
Finally, the research on apologies in civil cases has demonstrated
that the effects of apologies can be somewhat complex. The more
complete an apology is-containing components such as acceptance of
responsibility for having caused harm, a promise to refrain from similar
conduct in the future, or an offer of repair in addition to an expression
of remorse-the greater its effects tend to be. 0 In particular, broad
apologies that include the acceptance of responsibility for having caused
harm appear to have consistently positive effects on lay people's
47. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from
Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1452-53 (2000); Steve S. Kraman, A Risk
Management Program Based on Full Disclosure and Trust: Does Everyone Win?, 27
COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 253, 254 (2001); Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk
Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963,
964-65 (1999); Albert W. Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 970, 971 (1999). If, however, the hospital determines that the care
provided was adequate, no settlement offer is made. Kraman, supra note 47, at 256-57.
48. Kraman, supra note 47, at 255; Kraman & Hamm, supra note 47, at 964-65. The
hospital reports that as compared to thirty-five comparable VA hospitals over the seven-year
period following implementation of the policy, the Lexington hospital was in the top twenty
percent of facilities in terms of the number of claims against it (possibly reflecting the fact
that more patients learn of errors) but was among the lowest twenty-five percent of facilities
in terms of the amount of total payments. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 47, at 965 & fig.;
Wu, supra note 47, at 971.
49. E.g., University of Michigan Health System, John's Hopkins, Children's Healthcare
of Atlanta, and Sturdy Memorial Hospital in Boston. See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital
Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73, 78 (2003); Virginia L.
Morrison, Heyoka: The Shifting Shape of Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 21 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 931, 951-54 (2005); Lindsey Tanner, Doctors Eye Apologies for Medical Mistakes,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2004; Rachel Zimmerman, Medical Contrition: Doctors' New
Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying 'I'm Sorry,' WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at Al; see also Rita
Marie Barsella, Sincere Apologies Are Priceless, SORRYWORKS! COALITION, JULY 2, 2007,
http://www.sorryworks.net/article50.phtml; Chris Stern Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter,
Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against Hospitals: New York City's Pilot Project, 25
HEALTH AFF. 1394, 1395 (2006) (describing pilot program with nineteen cases; 91% (ten of
eleven cases) in which the defense offered an apology settled as compared to only 38% (three
of eight cases) when no apology was offered).
50. Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and Subjective Account Components on
Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465, 480 (2004). See Darby & Schlenker, Children's
Reactions to Apologies, supra note 1, at 742-43. See generally Scher & Darley, supra note 1.
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perceptions and settlement decisions. The effects of partial apologies
that express sympathy, but do not accept responsibility, are more
context dependent, having effects that are similar to but smaller than
those of full apologies in some circumstances-particularly when the
injury to the victim is less severe or when responsibilities are less clear-
and not in others.
III. APOLOGIES IN PLEA BARGAINING
As we have seen, studies examining the effects of remorse and
apologies in both the context of criminal sentencing52 and the context of
civil negotiation 3 find that apologies produce generally favorable
effects. Despite these findings, it is not necessarily the case that
defendants will receive more favorable plea offers as a result of
apologies or other remorseful conduct. There are many explanations
for why apologies might not lead to greater lenience in the negotiation
of criminal cases. We contend that the principal reason to expect a
diluted impact of apologies is the near absence of victims" and (often)
defendants from the negotiating table.5  Put another way, the
prosecutor's role as the negotiator for the state alters the negotiation
dynamic in significant ways. Criminal prosecutors represent the state,
not the crime victim, and are not required to follow the wishes of the
victim in resolving the case. The degree to which a crime victim has
control over the prosecutor varies from limited to non-existent.56 Thus,
while civil plaintiffs have significant input in directing their attorneys'
51. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 41, at 497-99.
52. See Ward, supra note 34, at 131.
53. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
54. While it is true that victims are enjoying a more expansive role in criminal cases than
in the past, their influence over important decisions in the processing of criminal cases
remains small. O'Hear, supra note 11, at 86-87. As the role of victims continues to expand,
the impact of apologies in plea negotiations may also change. For an analysis of possible
ramifications of increased victim involvement in plea negotiations, see Simon N. Verdun-
Jones & Adamira A. Tijerino, Four Models of Victim Involvement During Plea Negotiations:
Bridging the Gap Between Legal Reforms and Current Legal Practice, 46 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUSTICE 471, 486-91 (2004). Still, it is unlikely in the foreseeable
future that victims in criminal cases will have as large a role as victims or plaintiffs in civil
cases.
55. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 18, at 97 ("Beginning with arrest, [the criminal
defendant] enters an adversarial system in which two lawyers, not the defendant and the
victim, are the main actors.").
56. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 61-63 (2007).
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conduct, at least theoretically,57 crime victims have a much more
attenuated role in the dispute resolution process. 8 While lay persons
tend to respond to apologies and remorse in ways that might lead them
to reduce their desire for and expectations regarding remedies,59 recent
research has indicated that their legally trained representatives respond
in just the opposite way.60 Thus, we argue more lenient resolutions may
not accrue to criminal defendants during plea negotiations.
A. The Dynamics of Plea Negotiations
Scholars and practitioners have long examined the various factors
that influence the plea bargaining process. One factor that has not been
adequately considered is the role of apologies in plea bargaining.
Apologies might affect prosecutorial decision making in a number of
ways. One possibility, suggested by Bibas and Bierschbach, is that
prosecutors might be more likely to dismiss or reduce charges in cases
where a defendant apologizes or otherwise appears remorseful.6 '
Alternately, prosecutors might treat an apology like a confession-a
statement of great evidentiary value that strengthens the prosecutor's
case and thereby renders a favorable plea offer less necessary. A third
possibility is that an apology might have no significant effect on plea
bargaining. In order to draw any conclusions about apologies and plea
bargaining, we first outline the factual and theoretical assumptions we
make regarding plea bargaining.
1. Theories of Plea Bargaining
A determination of what factors will influence plea bargaining will
depend largely on the goals and justifications of plea bargaining.
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to settle a matter.").
58. Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital Victims'
Families and the Press, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 486 (2003) ("Perhaps the most common
complaint by American crime victims and their families is that they are ignored."); Strang &
Sherman, supra note 10, at 16 ("Victims are widely recognized to be the neglected party in
the criminal justice process. Neither their needs nor their preferences are usually taken into
account in the prosecution and sentencing of offenders."). If it is, indeed, the case that
victims are more likely to value apologies than are prosecutors, the effect of apologies on plea
bargaining may vary depending on how involved the victim is in the process. See generally
Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987).
59. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
60. Id.
61. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 18, at 129.
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Theories abound for why plea bargaining takes place at all and why it
has emerged as the predominant method of resolving criminal cases.
Plea bargaining has long overtaken trial as the primary means of
resolving cases in the American criminal justice system, and the number
of trials is now miniscule compared to the number of guilty pleas.62
While a brief examination of some theories is worthwhile, we decline to
undertake here a thorough analysis of the various justifications for plea
bargaining or to select among proffered theories. Indeed, we suspect
that each of the explanations for why defendants and prosecutors
negotiate away a trial might apply some of the time and that the reason
for entering a plea agreement in one case may be completely
inapplicable in another. That said, it makes sense that the impact of an
apology or showing of remorse would vary based on the driving
justification for the agreement.
The conventional wisdom is that plea bargaining is motivated
predominantly by the state's need for efficiency in managing
monumental caseloads.63  While defendants' desire for reduced
sentences makes such agreements feasible, many scholars have
theorized that it is caseload pressure that drives the plea bargaining
regime. 64 If true, apologies would have little effect on the likelihood of a
plea agreement because they would not alter the caseload pressure.
However, under this theory, apologies might affect the terms of plea
agreements. Prosecutors could encourage clear and early apologies and
could use them as an easy way to distinguish between otherwise similar
cases. That is, a case in which a defendant has rendered an apology to
the victim might yield a lower sentence recommendation than one in
which the victim suffered a similar harm but received no apology or
other indication of remorse. Defendants and their attorneys would be
careful to craft apologies that were responsive to known prosecutorial
preferences in order to generate more favorable plea offers.
A second common theory of plea bargaining is that parties seek to
enter plea agreements when the evidence in their favor is weak in order
62. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 60 (1968) (describing significant pressures brought to bear on defendants to plead guilty).
63. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative
Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 483 (1976) (explaining
that plea bargaining is needed t6 allow prosecutors and judges to manage the system and
process the maximum number of offenders); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 297 (1983) (noting that plea bargaining allows the
prosecution of more offenders despite the limited resources of the state).
64. Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 1040.
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to hedge their bets against the possibility of a total loss.6 Under this
theory, apologies would likely reduce the frequency of plea bargaining
or lead to less favorable terms for defendants to the extent that they
provided the prosecution with fairly strong evidence of guilt. And of
course, a defendant who has admitted both guilt and regret is not likely
to want to proceed to trial even in the face of an unattractive plea offer.
A third popular explanation for the prevalence of plea bargaining
arises from social science research examining the criminal justice system
as an institution and the social dynamics between the institutional
stakeholders. 66  Under this theory, defense attorneys, prosecuting
attorneys, judges, and other decision makers in the criminal justice
setting strive to avoid conflict and maintain their working relationships
in order to further their individual and collective goals. 67 The ability to
reach agreements regarding pleas, then, is personally satisfying and is
both an indicator and a symptom of positive professional ties and
relationships. 68 It is unclear what effect apologies might have in a
criminal justice system where this rationale for plea bargaining prevails.
It would be awkward, though perhaps still possible, to give no weight to
a genuine apology issued through a friend or colleague and still foster a
positive relationship. On the other hand, if the parties are already being
as cooperative as they can reasonably be in negotiating pleas, apologies
might have no significant procedural effect on plea agreements. They
might nonetheless result in other collateral societal benefits.
65. The ability of prosecutors to bargain away, rather than dismiss, weak cases has been
a central criticism of the plea bargaining system. See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295 (2006) ("When plea bargaining is available,
prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in nearly every case, including very weak cases."); see
also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1065, 1127 (1976) (advocating reforms to the plea system in order to ensure that
weak cases would result in a trial).
66. Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 1041-43.
67. Id. at 1042 (citing JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 24-28 (1977); PETER F. NARDULLI,
THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66-
81 (1978); George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 331 (1970);
Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational
Perspective, 7 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 407, 413-16 (1973); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in
the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 53-55 (1967)); see also SAMUEL WALKER,
TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 87
(1993) (discussing the "informal norms" established by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges that encourage plea bargaining).
68. See Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 1042 n.14 and accompanying text.
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2. Empirics of Plea Bargaining
Beyond theories of plea bargaining, it is also worth examining,
factually, what is meant by plea bargaining. While it is true that there
are overwhelmingly more guilty pleas than there are trials, not all cases
that result in pleas are the result of real bargaining. Schulhofer has
defined plea bargaining generally as "any process in which inducements
are offered in exchange for a defendant's cooperation in not fully
contesting the charges against him., 69 While this definition provides an
excellent starting point, a definition which involves any process may be
too broad for our purposes here.
Many defendants plead guilty without the benefit (or perhaps
burden) of an agreement. At times the prosecutor is unwilling to make
an agreement of any kind and yet the defendant may have no desire to
exercise her right to a trial. Particularly in less serious cases-most
notably those that might not involve incarceration-the financial,
emotional, and time costs of going to trial are enough to induce many
defendants to plead guilty even without concessions by the
prosecution." In addition, there are occasions in which the agreement
proposed by the prosecution is viewed as no "bargain" at all by the
defense. Either the defendant is unwilling to accept constraints imposed
by the agreement such as the waiver of appeal rights,7' or she is
confident that she can obtain a satisfactory result from the judge without
the prosecutor's help.72
There are also important procedural differences in how plea
bargaining occurs. The process of plea bargaining is as varied as the
contexts in which it occurs. On one end of the plea bargaining
spectrum, agreements are struck with little or no negotiation. In the
context of large numbers of misdemeanors or low-level felony cases,
plea agreements are often the result of an assembly line model of case
processing in which prosecutors-based largely on police reports-
assign a preliminary plea offer to each case.73 This preliminary offer is
69. Id. at 1037.
70. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 186-87 (1979).
71. For instance, it has become increasingly common to ask defendants to waive their
rights to appeal a contested sentence. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers
and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 220-21 (2005); Margareth Etienne,
The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1237-38 (2005).
72. Etienne, supra note 71, at 1238-39.
73. FEELEY, supra note 70, at 187-88 (describing a "supermarket" model of plea
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often the final offer. In many of these cases, the prosecutor has had no
prior contact with the defendant, victim, law enforcement officer, or
defense attorney before the opening negotiation offer is made.
Unrepresented defendants often accept the plea offer without
discussion.74 In cases with represented defendants, prosecutors and
defense attorneys have a general sense of the "value" of a typical case
and usually settle quickly on a sentence with little or no discussion.75
On the other end of the negotiation spectrum, plea deals are the
result of lengthy and drawn out bargaining processes. Negotiations in
white collar crime cases provide a typical example of this protracted
bargaining model. In white collar and large criminal conspiracy cases,
much of the plea bargaining occurs prior to indictment. Defendants
typically know well before they are charged that they are a target of a
criminal investigation. Defense attorneys advocate on behalf of their
clients early in the process and play a central role in framing the charges
to be indicted. It is not unusual in such cases for defendants to express
remorse.
Many plea agreements fall somewhere on the spectrum that runs
from supermarket bargaining to protracted bargaining. In our
examination about the effects of apologies on plea bargaining, we
unabashedly assume that some actual bargaining occurs, although we
recognize that this assumption does not necessarily mirror reality. We
do so for two reasons. First, our analysis focuses largely on the
psychosocial dynamics that occur between negotiating parties during the
process of criminal bargaining. Second, it is likely that the preliminary
sentence rates set during supermarket bargaining are established in the
shadow of, and as a result of, the explicitly negotiated sentences. That
is, prosecutors use their experiences to predict the going rate for an
offense and, for the sake of efficiency in the face of huge caseloads, set
the supermarket rate at what they believe would be the final negotiated
outcome. If apologies are a factor in heavily negotiated agreements, we
would predict that over time, prosecutors would account for apologies in
negotiations in which prices are pre-set and even unhappy customers "rarely 'bargain"').
74. Indeed, prosecutors are wary of the ethical pitfalls of discussing a case with an
unrepresented party. Model Rule 3.8(c) provides, "The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall ... (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(c) (2007). This language is often interpreted to prohibit any type of plea negotiation with
an unrepresented defendant. For a general discussion of these ethical concerns, see Ben
Kempinen, The Ethics of Prosecutor Contact with the Unrepresented Defendant, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1147 (2006).
75. See Kempinen, supra note 74, at 1149-53.
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determining the initial price of the crime under a supermarket
bargaining system. Consequently, in this initial examination of the
impact of apologies on plea bargaining, we limit our inquiry to explicitly
negotiated cases based on the belief that the weight given to apologies in
those cases will eventually be felt in less explicitly negotiated
agreements as well.
B. Victims and Apologies
As with civil plaintiffs, there is evidence that many victims of crime
want to receive apologies from their offenders. For example, in one
study, approximately ninety percent of victims interviewed expressed a
desire for an apology.76 But victims may not simply want just any
apologies from offenders-it seems that the perceived sincerity of the
apologies offered also matters to victims. Sincere apologies are more
likely to be accepted and to have the positive effects described above
than are apologies that are perceived to be insincerely offered.7  As
Dale Miller has argued, "When victims perceive apologies to be
insincere and designed simply to 'cool them out,' they often react with
more rather than less indignation., 7  How, when, and to whom
76. Strang & Sherman, supra note 10, at 39 & fig.ll (describing empirical study); see also
Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic
Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 433,
442 (1998).
77. See, e.g., Daniel P. Skarlicki et al., When Social Accounts Backfire: The Exacerbating
Effects of a Polite Message or an Apology on Reactions to an Unfair Outcome, 34 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 336 (2004) (finding that ultimatum offers accompanied by apologies that
were perceived as manipulative were more likely to be rejected); Edward C. Tomlinson et al.,
The Road to Reconciliation: Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a
Broken Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165, 171 (2004) (finding that apologies described as "sincere"
resulted in greater willingness to reconcile than those that were not). See also studies finding
the importance of sincerity of excuses: Jerald Greenberg, Looking Fair vs. Being Fair:
Managing Impressions of Organizational Justice, in 12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 111, 128-31 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1990) (reviewing studies);
Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, Social Accounts in Conflict Situations: Using Explanations to
Manage Conflict, 46 HUM. REL. 349, 359 (1993). But see evidence that even insincere
apologies are accepted and valued by recipients: Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry,
"I've Said I'm Sorry, Haven't l?" A Study of the Identity Implications and Constraints That
Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 19 (1994) (finding a
tendency for participants to accept even an unconvincing apology); Gross & Matheson, supra
note 58, at 502 (quoting crime victim's response to offender's apology: "The words helped,
whether he meant them or not."); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer
Differences in the Acceptance of Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 418 (2007).
78. Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
527, 538 (2001); see also Robert A. Baron, Attributions and Organizational Conflict: The
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apologies are offered may influence how sincere the apologies are
perceived to be.
For example, apologies that accept responsibility for having caused
harm are perceived as being more sincere and are more consistently
effective than statements that merely express sympathy for the harm.79
Accepting responsibility, by acknowledging and reaffirming the rule
violation that has occurred, distinguishes apologies from other ways of
accounting for one's behavior, such as justifications and excuses.'
Similarly, apologies that are appropriately timed, coming soon after a
period of introspection and opportunity to reflect, tend to be more
effective .8
In addition, apologies are thought to be most sincere when they are
offered directly by the offender to the victim. As one scholar of
apologies has noted: "[T]he bedrock structure of apology is binary, a
product of a relationship between the Offender and the Offended that
can neither be reduced nor augmented without undergoing a radical
metamorphosis." 82 In particular, apologies given and received through
Mediating Role of Apparent Sincerity, 41 ORG. BEHAV. HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 111
(1988); Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451,451-53 (1952).
79. See, e.g., Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 41, at 359 (finding
that apologies that accept responsibility for having caused the harm are perceived to be more
sincere than are apologies that only express sympathy); Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal
Settlement, supra note 41 (unpublished portion of the data) (same); Scher & Darley, supra
note 1, at 134 (finding that additional components, such as accepting responsibility, improve
the effectiveness of apologies).
80. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE
PUBLIC ORDER 113-16 (1971); Barry R. Schlenker & Bruce W. Darby, The Use of Apologies
in Social Predicaments, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 271, 271 (1981); Barry R. Schlenker & Michael
F. Weigold, Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 133, 162 (1992); Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33
AM. SOC. REV. 46, 46-47 (1968); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS 115 (1998) ("Full acceptance of responsibility by the wrongdoer is the
hallmark of an apology.").
81. See, e.g., Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late Than Early:
The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201,
205-06 (2005); see also Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83
JUDICATURE 180, 186-87 (2000) ("Apologies offered in settlements differ from ones offered
spontaneously. Negotiated apologies are a bargained for exchange that seem inherently less
sincere than spontaneous apologies."); Weiner et al., supra note 1, at 299-300 (finding
improved perceptions of wrongdoers who confessed and apologized spontaneously and for
wrongdoers who did so only following an accusation, but finding greater improvement for
spontaneous confessors; finding that accused confessors were more likely to be perceived as
motivated by impression management than were spontaneous confessors).
82. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION 46-47 (1991). "As the offender, for example, I cannot have someone
apologize on my behalf any more than I, as the offended, can forgive by proxy or have
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intermediaries-defense attorneys and prosecutors-may not have the
same effects as apologies offered directly by defendants to victims.
Importantly, victims do not typically participate in the plea bargaining
process. Instead, prosecutors negotiate on behalf of the state. 8
Similarly, defense attorneys tend to do the negotiating on the defense
side. 84 Thus, even if victims had some influence over prosecutors' plea
bargaining decisions, there is little opportunity during the plea
bargaining process for offenders and victims to communicate directly
with each other to give and receive apologies in this way.85 While
attorneys may successfully offer apologies on behalf of their clients in
some instances, 6 it would not be surprising if the effect of such
mediated apologies was attenuated. 87 Accordingly, given the absence of
direct victim and offender participation, apologies in the context of plea
bargaining may be less effective than in other contexts.
C. Prosecutors and Apologies
As this all suggests, a particularly important feature of the system is
that the defense conducts the plea negotiation with the prosecutor-not
the crime victim. This aspect of the structure of this negotiation may
have additional important implications for the effect of apologies on
plea bargaining outcomes.
In particular, prosecutors may respond differently to apologies than
do victims. Indeed, there is evidence in the civil context that lawyers
respond differently to apologies in some respects than do lay people.
This research shows that attorneys' and claimants' overall assessments
of apologies and the information communicated by apologies are
another bestow this gift without my knowledge or consent." Id. at 49.
83. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 61.
84. See id. at 44-47.
85. "It is important to acknowledge that offenders are highly restricted, both
procedurally and interpersonally, while attempting to express remorse in the traditional
criminal justice system." Susan J. Szmania & Daniel E. Mangis, Finding the Right Time and
Place: A Case Study Comparison of the Expression of Offender Remorse in Traditional Justice
and Restorative Justice Contexts, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 335, 356 (2005).
86. Hyman & Schechter, supra note 49, at 1397.
87. See Mark S. Umbreit et al., The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: Two Decades
of Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 30 (2001) (reviewing studies finding relatively high rates
of victim satisfaction with victim-offender mediation programs, but that participants in such
programs who met face-to-face with their offenders were more satisfied than participants who
did not meet face-to-face but instead engaged in a process of "shuttle" mediation); see also
Szmania & Mangis, supra note 85, at 356 (explaining that "even if an offender attempts to
communicate remorse, the effort will likely be incomplete or inadequate" in the eyes of the
court, the community and the victims).
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similar-with both groups making similar assessments of the sufficiency
of a defendant's apology and making similar attributions about the
offender's character, regret, future behavior, respect for the claimant,
and so on.8 Interestingly, however, attorneys' legal responses to
apologies differ from those of individual claimants. Specifically, as
noted above, claimants respond to apologies in ways that are favorable
to the defendant-i.e., they felt less anger and more sympathy, were
inclined to forgive, thought less harsh punishment was warranted,
aspired to receive lower monetary amounts in settlement of their claim,
and named lower monetary amounts as fair settlement values. In
contrast, attorneys' evaluations of their clients' emotions and likely
inclination to forgive and their own views of appropriate punishment
have been shown to be unaffected by defendant apologies. In addition,
their aspirations for settlement and their judgments of a fair settlement
value have been shown to increase when an apology is offered.89
Prosecutors are, of course, lawyers acting in a representative
capacity and might be thought to respond differently to apologies than
crime victims. Prosecutors, in their representational role and as repeat
players in the system,90 are more likely to be detached from the
interpersonal aspects of the dispute. They have neither been injured nor
alleged to have committed an offense, the relationships at issue are not
theirs, and they have seen a range of similar and different cases that
permit them to put the instant incident in a broader perspective. 9 The
detachment inherent in this representational role may cause prosecutors
to respond differently to an apology or expression of remorse than
might a victim of the crime.' Indeed, recent experimental research in
non-legal contexts has shown that third parties generally respond
differently to apologies than do apology recipients, with observers
88. Robbennolt, supra note 59.
89. Id.
90. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006) (describing prosecutors as one group of a set of "insiders"
who are the "professional repeat players who dominate criminal justice"); Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (discussing repeat players).
91. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1052; Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, When
Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation, 4 NEGOT. J. 395, 397 (1988);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 662 (1976) (arguing that an agent or "affiliate normally
brings to the dispute a degree of objectivity which the actor-disputant cannot attain").
92. See Rubin & Sander, supra note 91, at 397 (describing the "detachment" of agents in
negotiation).
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paying more attention to distinctions between sincere and insincere
apologies than do recipients.9"
Moreover, there is evidence that attorneys tend to be more
analytical,94 more focused on legal rights and evidence, 9 and less
emotional than are non-lawyers. 96 Lawyers are selected and trained to
be focused on dispassionate analysis. As Professors Korobkin and
Guthrie have noted, to be accepted into law school, "an applicant must
demonstrate a higher-than-average ability to think analytically."'  Law
schools then tend to emphasize the ability "to analyze legal conflicts
carefully and unemotionally." 9 Specifically, "[m]any law schools train
future judges and prosecutors to use cost-benefit, net-present-value
analysis when assessing outcomes." 99 In addition, attorneys are trained
93. Risen & Gilovich, supra note 77.
94. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1426 (1997); Chris
Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments
to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 156 (2001); Leonard
L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29,45 (1982).
95. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce
Practice, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 149, 171 (1994).
96. See Daicoff, supra note 94, at 1352; Guthrie, supra note 94, at 155; Riskin, supra note
94, at 45.
97. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 87 (1997).
98. Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 663 ("If, as is frequently the case, the
affiliate is a professional, objectivity may itself be a norm in which he is schooled.").
99. Bibas, supra note 90, at 922-23; Riskin, supra note 94, at 45 ("Lawyers are trained to
put people and events into categories that are legally meaningful, to think in terms of rights
and duties established by rules, to focus on acts more than persons. This view requires a
strong development of cognitive capabilities, which is often attended by the under-cultivation
of emotional faculties."). Riskin cites the following example:
A law school classroom incident shows how quickly this deafness
afflicts students-usually without anyones [sic] noticing. Professor Kenney
Hegland writes:
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various
doctrines we had recently studied. I put the following:
In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to
deliver widgets at the rate of 1000 a month. The first two deliveries
are perfect. However, in the third month Seller delivers only 999
widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed with this that he rejects the
delivery, cancels the remaining deliveries and refuses to pay for the
widgets already delivered. After stating the problem, I asked "If
you were Seller, what would you say?" What I was looking for was
a discussion of the various common law theories which would force
the buyer to pay for the widgets delivered and those which would
throw buyer into breach for cancelling the remaining deliveries. In
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to focus on legal rules, legally relevant facts, and the probative value of
evidence, and it is this expertise that is expected of them.'°° Consistent
with this focus, a number of studies have identified the strength of the
evidence as one of the primary influences on prosecutors' plea
bargaining decisions."'
Thus, to the extent that an apology by a criminal defendant provides
evidence of the defendant's responsibility for having committed a crime,
the apology may serve to bolster the prosecutor's case."° Indeed, there
is evidence from the civil context that when an offender admits
short, I wanted the class to come up with the legal doctrines which
would allow Seller to crush Buyer.
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a
volunteer. As is so often the case with the first year students, I
found that they were all either writing in their notebooks or
inspecting their shoes. There was, however, one eager face, that of
an eight year old son of one of my students. It seems that he was
suffering through Contracts due to his mother's sin of failing to find
a sitter. Suddenly he raised his hand. Such behavior, even from an
eight year old, must be rewarded.
"OK," I said, "What would you say if you were the seller?"
"I'd say 'I'm sorry'."
Id. at 45-46 (quoting Hegland, Why Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on "Never Ask Why,"
in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, Monograph III, 68-69 (1982)).
100. See William K. Bartels, Recent Developments, The Stormy Seas of Apologies:
California Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harbor for Apologies Made After
Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 151 (2001); McEwen et al., supra note 95, at 171; Rubin
& Sander, supra note 91, at 397.
101. Kenneth Adams, The Effect of Evidentiary Factors on Charge Reduction, 11 J.
CRIM. JUST. 525, 525 (1983); Alschuler, supra note 62, at 58 ("The overwhelming majority of
prosecutors view the strength or weakness of the state's case as the most important factor in
the task of bargaining."); Stephen P. Lagoy et al., An Empirical Study on Information Usage
for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 435, 439-40
(1976); William F. McDonald et al., Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case Against Plea-
Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING 1, 22 (William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer eds.,
1980); H.S. MILLER ET AL., PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES (1978).
102. As a general matter, confession evidence is quite powerful. See, e.g., Saul M.
Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test
of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 481 (1997); Saul M.
Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and
Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 56-57 (2004). In assessing the role of apologies in plea
bargaining, we must be mindful of the various alternatives. Most cases do not present a
binary choice between "an apology" and "no apology." Cases fall into various categories. In
some cases, the defendant makes no admission of guilt or expression of remorse whatsoever.
In other instances, the defendant may confess or make a partial admission of guilt without
expressing remorse. A third possibility is that a defendant may make an apology that
expresses both guilt and remorse. It is certainly possible that a prosecutor would respond to
each of these alternatives differently.
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responsibility for having caused harm, claimants and attorneys estimate
the injured party's chances of winning at trial to be greater than when
the offender does not admit responsibility (but merely expresses
sympathy).' °3 For claimants, this tendency is outweighed by other
effects that incline them to settle.'" However, for attorneys, the
evidentiary value of the apology may be the focus. There is no reason to
assume that the differing impact of apologies on lawyers as compared to
lay persons would not apply equally to civil as well as criminal cases.
Another reason that apologies might impact prosecuting attorneys
differently than victims of crime is that prosecutors may also have a
particularly difficult time disengaging from prosecution once the process
has begun and resources have been invested. In the civil context, we
know that plaintiffs can become invested in continuing the litigation and
may be more reluctant to settle or walk away after having "spent a great
deal of money on pretrial motions and discovery."' 05 The psychological
effects of these sunk costs, which make it difficult for civil claimants to
abandon their efforts, may make it difficult for victims and prosecutors
to do so as well.'" In criminal cases, however, it is the prosecutor and
law enforcement agents, not the victims, who invest time and resources
into the pretrial process and who face the costs of prosecution. Thus, it
may be easier for victims in criminal cases to walk away from litigation
than plaintiffs in civil cases. Yet criminal victims are not empowered to
walk away. That authority is in the hands of the prosecutor who, like
the civil claimant, has actually borne the sunk costs of pretrial litigation.
In addition, crime victims and other injured parties may "care about
a much wider array of justice concerns than do lawyers, including their
own status, the other side's blameworthiness, and apologies."'" ° In the
civil context, these differences between the perspectives of claimants
and attorneys may get negotiated between attorney and client. 8
However, as noted above, criminal prosecutors have vastly more
103. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 41, at 362, 367
(claimants); Robbennolt, supra note 59 (attorneys).
104. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 41, at 370-71.
105. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 24 (1999).
106. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124-25 (1985); Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive
Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).
107. Bibas, supra note 90, at 931.
108. See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1450
(1992).
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decision-making authority and discretion than do civil plaintiffs'
attorneys, and they have no obligation to follow the wishes of crime
victims. ' Thus, prosecutors' reactions to defendant apologies are likely
to hold more sway than the reactions of victims.
D. Additional Considerations
There are additional reasons why apologies could result in harsher
plea agreements. An apology may show the prosecuting attorney that
she has the upper hand. It may also serve as a signal that the defendant
lacks the appetite for a legal battle and would prefer a quick
resolution. ° A defendant who desperately wants to plead is more likely
to accept the plea offer presented. Following an admission of guilt, her
attorney will have little leverage to obtain a more favorable plea offer.
The primary leverage that defendants have is the threat of trial, and this
threat may become far less credible after an apology.
A defendant's apology may provide an important signal to the
prosecutor but it may also serve as a signal for her own defense
attorney. This adds an important complication. Criminal defense
attorneys, particularly public defenders and those appointed to
represent the indigent, commonly labor under heavy caseloads. "' They
manage these caseloads by triage-focusing on the cases most likely to
go to trial or that are the most winnable."2 A case in which a defendant
apologizes early is unlikely to be either triable or winnable. A defense
attorney who is engaging in triage is likely to spend fewer resources
investigating and researching a case with a statement by the defendant
expressing responsibility or remorse. Thus, even absent the impact of
an apology on the prosecution of the case, an apology may affect the
defense of the case, likely resulting in a less favorable plea agreement
for the defendant.
Finally, the importance of contextual factors have been largely
overlooked among theorists arguing in favor of encouraging offender
apologies pervasively throughout every stage of the criminal process,
rather than just during and after sentencing. Apologies can be highly
109. DAVIS, supra note 56, 61-63.
110. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 18, at 97 ("Defense attorneys and prosecutors
usually view these expressions [of remorse] as relevant only to the defendant's willingness to
fight, plead, or perhaps cooperate.").
111. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1730-48
(1993) (discussing the heavy caseloads of criminal defense attorneys among other
disadvantages faced by criminal defendants).
112. Etienne, supra note 71, at 1228.
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contextual. The content and presentation of apologies vary based on
the context and medium. Similarly, the context of the apology may
determine the way in which it is perceived by victims and observers. In
a recent case study, Szmania and Mangis provide a close analysis of
three apologies proffered by a man convicted of vehicular
manslaughter."3 They conclude that the context of each apology-a
courtroom, a newspaper article, a face-to-face mediated encounter with
the victim's family-was a key determinant of the substantive
expression of remorse, the delivery, the rhetoric, and the effectiveness
of each apology. "4 Without overstating the generalizability of their
findings, Szmania and Mangis's work serves as an important reminder
that even sincere apologies are not fungible and cannot be divorced
from their context. An apology issued during the course of negotiations
may not be formulated or understood in the same way as an apology
issued at the time of the offense, during a plea colloquy, at sentencing,
or post-conviction. Even assuming that victims, defendants, and
communities benefit from apologies, it stands to reason that the extent
of the societal benefit will vary from one context to another.
IV. CONCLUSION
To date, few have examined the role that remorse or apology might
play in plea bargaining. To the extent that scholars and practitioners
have considered apology in the criminal justice context at all, they have
focused predominantly on its role in sentencing. In this paper, we have
considered the impact that apologies or other remorseful conduct might
have on plea bargaining.
We began by accepting the premise that crime victims, offenders,
and communities might all benefit from a criminal system that
encourages apologies. The most beneficial apologies are clear,
unequivocal, sincere, timed appropriately, and come directly from the
wrongdoer."5  It has been argued that the most obvious way to
encourage such apologies early in the criminal justice process would be
for prosecutors to reward contrite defendants with dismissals or
favorable plea offers. This proposal is not without merit because in the
criminal law context, remorse and apologies are often said to result in
more lenient sentences. Yet we argue that the dynamics of negotiations
113. Szmania & Mangis, supra note 85, at 337.
114. Id. at 340-43.
115. TAVUCHIS, supra note 82, at 46-47; Frantz & Bennigson, supra note 81, at 201;
Shuman, supra note 81, at 186-87; Weiner et al., supra note 1, at 291.
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in criminal cases-plea bargaining by attorneys on behalf of victims and
offenders who are otherwise silenced by the norms and strictures of the
criminal justice system-may limit the impact of apologies in this
context. We also question the prediction that prosecutors would be
more favorably disposed toward defendants who apologize and raise
questions about how apologies rendered in the plea negotiation context
would be received by victims. Extrapolating from the increasingly
sophisticated research in the distinct fields of apology and plea
bargaining suggests that injecting apologies into plea bargaining may not
inexorably lead to the beneficial results predicted by some. Clearly,
more empirical research is needed that focuses squarely on apology and
remorse in the unique context of plea negotiations.
